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ABSTRACT 
 
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has not brought significant 
gains to the Portuguese economy in terms of real convergence with wealthier eurozone 
countries. We analyze the causes of the underperformance of the Portuguese economy 
in the last decade, discuss its growth prospects within the EMU, and make two 
proposals for urgent institutional reform of the EMU. We argue that, under the 
prevailing institutional framework, Portugal faces a long period of stagnation, high 
unemployment, and painful structural reform, and conclude that, in the absence of 
institutional reform of the EMU, getting out of the eurozone represents a serious 
political option for Portugal.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The sovereign debt crisis of Greece and other peripheral eurozone (hereafter EZ) 
countries like Portugal in 2010 has brought to the fore the rising heterogeneity observed 
within the EZ and the macroeconomic imbalances that such heterogeneity has led to. As 
several scholars have emphasized, there has been a persistent loss in international 
competitiveness (measured by relative unit labour costs) in the four Mediterranean EZ 
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) vis-à-vis Germany since the launch of the 
euro in 1999 (Lapavitsas et al. 2010). According to Lapavitsas et al. (2010), this is 
largely the result of a “race to the bottom” led (and won) by Germany encouraging 
flexibility, wage restraint, and part-time work even more than peripheral EZ countries. 
However, financial integration between the North and the South may have also 
contributed to the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances within the EZ by boosting 
demand, particularly private consumption, in the countries of the South. Be that as it 
may, this situation has translated into large current account deficits being exhibited by 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain (and Ireland) against Germany as well as high levels of 
indebtedness by both the private and public sector. Remarkably, this dim state of affairs 
was predicted by Kregel (1999) who prophetically wrote: 
 
Germany might be said to be exporting its unemployment to the 
rest of the EU member countries. The other member countries 
can only allow their nominal wage levels to evolve 
independently of Germany to the extent they can rely on 
productivity growth in excess of that of Germany… The result 
will be that beggar-thy-neighbor nominal exchange rate 
depreciations are replaced by beggar-thy-neighbor reductions in 
wage costs and prices. (Kregel 1999: 40). 
 
Despite Frankel and Rose’s (1998: 1011) proposition that “the suitability of 
European countries for EMU [Economic and Monetary Union] cannot be judged on the 
basis of historical data since the structure of these economies is likely to change 
dramatically as a result of EMU,” the evidence so far suggests that, except in the case of 
financial integration which has proceeded apace, there is no clear pattern of economic 
integration among EZ countries (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2010; Lane 2006). In the 
last decade, growth in Mediterranean EZ countries and Ireland has mainly come from 
expansion of consumption financed by rising private sector indebtedness (as in Greece 
and Portugal) or vigorous investment linked to real state bubbles (as in Ireland and   4
Spain). Therefore, the integration of peripheral countries in the EZ has so far been one-
sided in the sense that it has largely consisted of a rapid process of financial integration 
whereby these countries have financed their large current account deficits by way of 
increasing their indebtedness vis-à-vis core EZ countries, predominantly Germany. In 
turn, this scenario made them particularly vulnerable to the crisis of 2007–09 that 
subsequently led to the European sovereign debt crisis that erupted violently in the 
spring of 2010. Having now embarked upon ambitious fiscal consolidation and 
unpopular structural reforms, countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain face a decade 
of economic stagnation and high unemployment. Predictably, social unrest and 
domestic pressure on governments to “escape” from the EZ with the aim of easing 
adjustment through devaluation may become a serious political problem in the coming 
years.
1  
  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the growth prospects for Portugal in 
order to gauge, from a economic point of view, the convenience of its remaining inside 
the EMU under the current institutional framework. For that purpose, we use a blend of 
theoretical and data analysis. Our main conclusion is that, in the absence of institutional 
reform of the EMU, Portugal faces a long period of economic stagnation and that 
leaving the EZ currently represents the best way forward for Portugal.  
The study is organized as follows. Next section reviews the literature on the 
intra-eurozone current account imbalances with special attention to the Portuguese case. 
Section 3 analyses the recent evolution of the Portuguese economy. Section 4 discusses 
various economic policy strategies currently available to Portugal. Section 5 contains 
two proposals for institutional change in the EZ that, according to us, may help correct 
the current macroeconomic imbalances and resume economic growth in the EZ. Finally, 





                                                 
1 We should remind the reader at this juncture that membership in EMU is a concomitant of membership 
in the European Union (EU). Notwithstanding it, as suggested in Kenen (1999: 114), “it is entirely 
conceivable, moreover, that an EU member might be allowed to depart peaceably from EMU without 
being ejected from the EU.” 
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2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ABOUT INTRA-EMU 
MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
 
As we mentioned above, a key dimension of the rising heterogeneity within the EMU is 
the emergence of large current account deficits in the peripheral economies coupled 
with large trade surpluses in the core countries, especially Germany. Although the 
dominant view is that these macroeconomic imbalances reflect a rising divergence in 
relative competitiveness within the EZ, some scholars have suggested instead that the 
former are closely related to differences in GDP per capita. In this latter case, the policy 
implication is that such imbalances will tend to disappear over time provided there is 
real convergence among EZ countries. The purpose of this section is thus to review the 
literature that has discussed the causes of such macroeconomic imbalances.  
An early study to address this topic is in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). They 
use an open-economy model to show how, for poorer countries, goods and financial 
market integration are likely to lead to both a decrease in the saving rate and an increase 
in investment, and so to a larger current account deficit. They document that the 
changes in the current account balances of Portugal and Greece are part of a more 
general trend: the dispersion of current account positions among OECD countries has 
steadily increased since the early 1990s, and current account positions have become 
increasingly related to countries’ per capita GDP. They show that this trend is visible 
within the OECD as a whole but is stronger within the EZ. They go on to argue that the 
channel through which this occurs appears to be a decrease in private saving in the 
countries with widening current account deficits, rather than an increase in investment. 
Focusing on the cases of Portugal and Greece, they conclude that lower private saving, 
especially household saving—due both to internal and external financial liberalization 
but also to better growth prospects—and, to a much lesser extent, higher investment 
appear to be the main drivers of the current account deficits. They add that financial 
liberalization led to substantial decreases in nominal and real interest rates because the 
adoption of the euro eliminated country risk, thus opening the euro interbank market to 
Portuguese and Greek banks.  
Ahearne, Schmitz, and von Hagen (2008) examine whether capital tends to flow 
from rich to poor EZ countries and whether the creation of the euro has affected such 
flows. They run simple OLS regressions to examine the determinants of trade balances 
in individual European countries and any possible relationship between trade balances   6
and per capita income. They find that trade surpluses in the EU are a positive function 
of relative per capita GDP and that the relationship is strongly significant, i.e., countries 
with a larger per capita GDP have larger intra-EU trade surpluses. According to the 
authors, these results suggest that the EMU has increased capital market integration in 
Europe, with the result that capital flows are now more in line with what neoclassical 
theory predicts, thus indicating that the monetary union works well. They predict that, 
as capital flows from high- to low-per-capita GDP countries, these flows will promote 
economic convergence among EZ countries.  
Holinksi, Kool, and Muysken (2010) disagree to some extent with the previous 
argument that imbalances can be attributed to intertemporal maximization and thus to 
the existence of a European convergence process. According to proponents of this 
argument, countries with lower per capita GDP and productivity will attract foreign 
capital investment and, in the adjustment process, relative inflation will rise, thereby 
leading to real exchange rate appreciation and loss of relative international 
competitiveness. As a result, during the convergence process, current account deficits 
arise that match the surpluses on the capital accounts in surplus countries. Their 
disagreement with the so-called “economic convergence” hypothesis runs as follows. 
First, they find that the gap in terms of GDP per capita between northern and southern 
countries within the EZ has not narrowed over the period 1992–2007 so there has been 
little real convergence. In their view, the main reason for this is diverging total factor 
productivity between the two country groups over the period 1992 through 2007.
2 
Second, they argue that a better measure to determine the external price competitiveness 
of a country is its “terms of trade,” that is, the ratio of export over import prices that 
excludes the nontradable sector. By looking at the evolution of the terms of trade of 
countries, they show that the relative loss of competitiveness of southern countries is far 
less pronounced than inflation rate differentials suggest. Finally, they conclude that a 
more plausible explanation for the macroeconomic imbalances is that relatively higher 
inflation in the southern countries lowered ex ante real interest rates in these countries 
and induced higher consumption and investment.      
A thorough discussion of the causes of the underperformance of the Portuguese 
economy is in Blanchard (2007), who blames to an unfortunate combination of very 
                                                 
2 See, in particular, their figure 11 (Holinski, Kool, and Muysken 2010: 14) which is reproduced here as 
figure 10. 
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slow productivity growth and fast nominal wage growth for the loss of international 
competitiveness and the systematic current account deficits exhibited by Portugal since 
the launch of the euro in 1999. He notes that, with low unemployment, nominal wage 
growth was substantially higher than labor productivity growth in the last decade, 
thereby leading to growth in unit labor costs higher than in the rest of the EZ which 
accounts for over 70 percent of Portuguese foreign trade. According to Blanchard 
(2007), the effects of real overvaluation were compounded by “composition” effects in 
exports associated to direct competition from China and other Asian countries (see also 
Ahearne and Pisany-Ferry 2006). He points out that 60 percent of Portuguese exports 
are in “low-tech” goods compared to an average of 30 percent for the EZ and concludes 
that, even in the absence of overvaluation, the current account balance would have 
deteriorated due to these “composition” effects. According to him, in the absence of 
draconian policy measures, the most likely scenario is one of competitive disinflation, 
that is, an extended period of sustained high unemployment until competitiveness has 
been reestablished. The economic policy measures to be adopted include ambitious 
structural reforms aimed at increasing productivity as well as an “across-the-board” cut 
in nominal wages.  
Ahearne and Pisany-Ferry (2006) also claim that above-average inflation led to a 
marked deterioration in Portugal’s competitiveness, which has depressed exports. They 
note that Portugal enjoyed a spurt in growth in domestic demand and in the construction 
sector by the time of EMU entry, as real interest rates declined by more than 6 
percentage points. Notwithstanding, the loss of competitiveness eventually began to 
dominate. According to them, slow productivity growth and the composition of its 
exports left Portugal vulnerable to competition from low-cost producers, especially 
China. In addition, membership in the EMU exacerbated the loss of competitiveness 
and narrowed the policy options to offset the external shocks. They claim that, for 
countries like Portugal, there is “no solution other than the long, hard slog of structural 
adjustment” (Ahearne and Pisany-Ferry 2006: 6). They recommend wage restraint and 
increased competition in goods and services markets to keep inflation below the EZ 
average. 
Finally, Zemanek, Belke, and Schnabl (2009) also find that, ever since the 
creation of the EMU, the competitiveness of EZ countries has diverged steadily. They 
analyze the behavior of unit labor costs from 1999 to 2007 and find that, while 
Germany and Austria have kept the level of 1999, in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece,   8
and Italy unit labor costs have increased significantly up to 30 percent compared to 
1999. They list several reasons for the divergence in inflation rates: (i) differences in 
inflation traditions and expectations; (ii) the Balassa-Samuelson effect; (iii) 
idiosyncratic business cycles, which lead to persistent differences in real interest rates; 
and (iv) differences in the rates of wage and productivity growth. However, they 
concede that, besides unit labor cost divergences, nonprice competitiveness may also 
help explain intra-EZ current account imbalances. The former covers variables such as 
sectoral and geographical specialization of the export sector, production and technology 
structure, and the quality of products. For instance, they argue that “a country with 
(without) a sectoral specialization in difficult-to-imitate goods has an advantage 
(disadvantage) which allows (does not allow) higher relative wage growth” (Zemanek, 
Belke, and Schnabl 2009: 8). Further, low-technology and low-skill (labor-intensive) 
industries mostly compete by prices so that “wage growth is more harmful in these 
industries because competition with low labour costs countries such as the new EU 
members or East Asian countries is fiercer” (Zemanek, Belke, and Schnabl 2009: 9). 
They claim that rapid wage growth in countries with labor-intensive production (like 
Portugal) probably fuelled the loss of international competitiveness relative to countries 
with capital-intensive production like Germany. Finally, they argue that the only way 
out of the current dilemma is to implement structural reforms and deny that the former 
will lead to a “race to the bottom” with respect to wage cuts. Instead, they predict that 
“intra-euro area current account imbalances would diminish and the international 
competitiveness of Europe as a whole” would rise (Zemanek, Belke, and Schnabl 2009: 
31).   
 
3. RISING HETEROGENEITY WITHIN THE EUROZONE: THE CASE OF 
PORTUGAL   
 
As explained in the previous two sections, there has been a steady divergence in terms 
of relative competitiveness, inflation, and current account balances among EZ countries 
ever since the launch of the euro in 1999. The purpose of this section is to analyze the 
causes behind this phenomenon by focusing on the case of Portugal.  
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3.1. The Portuguese Economy in 1999 
After a strong economic expansion driven by a boom in domestic demand in the run-up 
to the creation of the euro, the Portuguese economy eventually reached full employment 
in 1999 (see table 1). Concomitantly, as shown in table 1, the current account deficit 
reached 8.5 percent of GDP in 1999. Therefore, there can be no doubt that in 1999 the 
Portuguese real effective exchange rate (hereafter REER) was well-above its 
equilibrium value and that Portugal entered the EZ with an overappreciated real 
exchange rate.
3 The current account deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP in 1999 was 
associated with a deficit in the trade balance of about 12 percent of GDP, which 
included a deficit in the energy account of 1.8 percent of GDP (see table 2). The trade 
deficit was partially offset by surpluses in both the balance of services and the net 
remittances of emigrants over immigrants. More specifically: 
 
Current account  ≈  trade balance  +  balance of services  +  net remittances 
- 8.5% GDP   ≈ - 11.9% GDP   +       1.6% GDP    +    2.6% GDP 
 
What about Portugal’s international investment position (IIP) in 1999?
4 From 
1985 through 1995, the Portuguese current account was roughly in equilibrium. The 
first significant deficits started only in 1996. As a result, in 1999 the Portuguese net 
external debt only amounted to 12 percent of GDP. Likewise, the net stock of both 
foreign direct investment and foreign investment in stocks was also relatively small. 
Therefore, as shown in figure 1, the IIP of the Portuguese economy solely represented  
-36 percent of GDP in 1999. In turn, this small negative IIP led to net factor payments 




                                                 
3 When an economy is at full employment, the value of its current account provides an indication of the 
deviation of the REER from its equilibrium level. More specifically, a current account deficit signals a 
REER above its equilibrium value, a surplus indicates a REER below it, and a current account balance 
suggests that the REER is at its equilibrium value. The same does not hold if an economy is below full 
employment. In this case, we cannot say a priori whether the REER is at or out of equilibrium since, for 
instance, a current account surplus may reflect a deficient domestic demand. If so, an increase in domestic 
demand up to full employment will raise imports and thus make the current account balance worsen at an 
unchanged REER. 
4 IIP = external reserves of the Portuguese monetary system - (net external debt + net stock of foreign 
direct investment in Portugal + net foreign holdings of Portuguese stocks). 
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3.2. What Happened after 1999? 
Domestic demand had increased at a rapid pace between 1995 and 1999. In 2000–01 it 
continued to grow, albeit at a lower rate. As a result of it, the current account deficit 
continued to increase to 10 percent of GDP, unemployment continued to fall to 4 
percent, and inflation shot up to 4.4 percent in 2001. In the next eight years, from 2002 
to 2009, domestic demand growth virtually disappeared (with annual growth of only 0.4 
percent). This was one of the two factors—the other was the adverse behavior of net 
external demand—that led to stagnation in the eight years up to 2009 (annual GDP 
growth of 0.35 percent) and to a steady increase in unemployment (to more than 10 
percent by the end of 2009). 
  As is well-known, a stagnant domestic demand often translates into low growth 
of imports and an improvement in the current account balance. However, instead of 
improving, the Portuguese current account deficit actually worsened from 1999 through 
2005–09, from 8.5 percent of GDP to 10.2 percent of GDP (see table 3). This larger 
current account deficit in spite of a stagnant domestic demand is a clear indication that, 
at least since 2005, the Portuguese REER strayed even farther from its equilibrium level 
than it was back in 1999. What led to this increase in the deviation of the REER from 
its equilibrium level between 1999 and 2005–09? 
 
3.3. The Trade Balance without Energy: 2005–09 versus 1999 
A look at the evolution of the various items of the current account in table 2 helps shed 
some light on this issue. On one side, two factors favorably affected the evolution of the 
current account between 1999 and 2005–09. A first factor was a decline in the trade 
deficit excluding energy. The second factor was an improvement in the surplus of the 
balance of services. The trade deficit excluding energy declined from about 10 percent 
in 1999 to about 7.3 percent of GDP in 2005–09.
5 This was due to a combination of a 
stagnant domestic demand in Portugal, which exhibited 0.4 percent annual growth, and 
a strong growth of imports of the main Portuguese trading partners amounting to 5.2 
percent average annual growth. In fact, the stagnant demand prevented a rapid growth 
of imports of goods in 2002–08 (3 percent average annual growth). In turn, the strong 
                                                 
5 These values were obtained by adding the values of the good and services balances shown in table 2 and 
subtracting for each year the corresponding value of the energy balance depicted in figure 2.    11
growth of goods imports of Portugal’s main trading partners led to a more rapid growth 
of goods exports in 2002–08 (3.7 percent average annual growth).
6 
However, if demand growth in Portugal had not remained below the growth of 
imports of Portugal’s main trading partners the trade deficit without energy would have 
increased for two reasons. First, according to the IMF (see figure 3), the Portuguese 
REER rose by about 13 percent between 1999 and 2008, measured both in HICP and in 
unit labor costs (most of the increase occurred between 1999 and 2003).
7 The reason 
was that relative prices and unit costs in Portugal increased in this period due to an 
especially high excess of nominal wage growth over labor productivity that was equal to 
2.7 percentage points per year compared to only 1.7 percentage points in the EZ. The 
loss of international competitiveness of Portugal can also be ascertained by looking at 
figure 4 which shows the evolution of the inflation rate in Portugal and the EZ. Second, 
over the same period Portugal was subject to a marked increase in competition from 
China and central and east European (CEE) countries (see Ahearne and Pisany-Ferry 
2006). These two facts led to an increase in the penetration of imports in the Portuguese 
market and, at the same time, to a sharp decline in the market share of Portuguese 
exports in the EU15.
8 Between 2003 and 2008 imports grew at an annual average rate of 
3.9 percent, more than twice the rate of total demand. In addition, the market share of 
Portuguese exports in the EU15 declined by 33 percent between 2003 and 2009, mainly 
in favor of China and of the CEE countries. The market shares of these two regions 
exports to the EU15 increased substantially over that period (Constâncio 2010). 
The new international environment faced by the Portuguese economy since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century deserves a brief comment. In 1993, a Uruguay 
Round agreement established a progressive elimination of export quotas of textiles, 
clothing, and footwear from less-developed to developed countries over a 10-year 
period (1995–2005). As a result, the market share of China in the EU15 increased 
                                                 
6 The key contributors to the growth of Portuguese exports were Angola and Spain. In 2002–08, goods 
exports to Spain and Angola grew at annual average rates of 10.1 and 21 percent, respectively. 
7 HIPC: harmonized consumer price index; ULC: unit labor cost. The REER based on ULC indicates the 
relation between ULCs in Portugal and in its main trading partners when expressed in the same currency. 
An increase in this indicator thus reveals that the ULC has risen by more in Portugal than in its trading 
partners, i.e., that Portuguese competitiveness has deteriorated. The REER based on HIPC indicates the 
relation between consumer prices in Portugal and its main trading partners. An increase in this indicator 
therefore implies that consumer prices have grown by more in Portugal than in its trading partners.   
8 The EU15 is the main destination of Portuguese goods exports, having accounted for 71 percent of the 
total in 2008. It includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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sharply at the expense of several southern European countries, mainly Portugal and 
Italy. In 2000–08, Portuguese exports of textiles, clothing and footwear suffered steep 
declines: average annual declines of 6.1, 21.2, and 4.5 percent, respectively (Bank of 
Portugal 2010: 211, table A.5.11). Consequently, the share of these three goods in total 
goods exports fell from 25 percent in 1999 (40 percent in 1993) to only 14 percent in 
2008 (Bank of Portugal 2009b: 294). 
Likewise, Portuguese exports of medium-to-high tech products like vehicles and 
electrical machines also lost market share over the last decade, especially to CEE 
countries, which have benefited from a combination of lower wages and a more skilled 
labor force (Bank of Portugal 2010: 144–5). In this respect, we may note that in 2000 
the average hourly wage in Portugal in manufacturing was equal to $5.67, roughly twice 
that in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.
9 In addition, as noted in 
Constâncio (2010), the qualification of the Portuguese workforce lagged—and still 
lags—far behind that of these countries. As a result, over the last decade the CEE 
countries have attracted large flows of FDI into medium-to-high tech sectors, which 
formerly had headed towards southern Europe, including Portugal. 
As we note above, the market share of Portuguese exports in the EU15 declined 
by 33 percent between 2003 and 2009. Nonetheless, over the same period the market 
share of goods exports in its main 34 trading partners declined by only 12 percent (see 
figure 5).
10 This was the result of a reorientation of Portuguese exports over the last 
decade from its traditional markets to new countries outside the EU15. From 1999 to 
2008 exports to these new markets grew at an annual average rate of 13.8 percent, 
compared to only 3.8 percent in the case of EU15 markets. 
 
3.4. Improvement in the Balance of Services between 1999 and 2005–09 
The surplus in the balance of services rose from 1.6 percent in 1999 to an average of 3.6 
percent of GDP in 2005–09. This was mainly the result of an excellent behavior of 
services exports, especially since 2006. In nominal terms, the exports of services grew 
by 19.9, 15.6, and 5.3 percent in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively (Bank of Portugal 
2010: 148, table 5.4). These rates exceeded the growth rates of nominal imports of 
                                                 
9 By 2008 however, the hourly wage in these countries had risen to almost the Portuguese level, $12.23 
(see Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons homepage). 
10 These partners account for 85 percent of Portuguese exports and include, besides the EU15 countries, 
Angola and the United States. 
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services in the same years, which were 15.9, 8.4, and 5.1 percent, respectively (Bank of 
Portugal 2010: 149, table 5.5) and thus led to an increase in the weight of services in 
total exports from 27 percent in 2005 to 33 percent in 2009 (see figure 6). It should be 
noted that this was an acceleration of a trend dating back to 1996, when services made 
up only 24 percent of total exports. In fact, between 1996 and 2009 services exports 
grew at twice the annual average rate of goods exports: 7.9 percent compared to 3.9 
percent (Cabral 2010). One consequence of this development is that in 2007–09 the 
surplus in the balance of services already covered 35 percent of the deficit in the goods 
balance compared to only 14 percent back in 1996 (see table 2). In turn, these numbers 
tell us that—as a result of increasing competition from China in textiles, clothes, and 
footwear and of the CEE countries in machines and autos—the specialization of 
Portugal has been switching towards the exports of services. In this respect, it is 
remarkable to note that by 2008 the weight of services in total exports, 33 percent, was 
already more than three times the weight of textiles, clothes, and footwear—9.5 
percent―that account for the traditional major Portuguese export sectors. 
  Finally, the high growth of service exports in the last decade or so did not reflect 
the behavior of its main sector—tourism.
11 Instead, the high growth of service exports 
was associated with the behavior of transport and “professional” services. These two 
types of services grew at double digit rates in 2006–08, and accounted for 26.5 and 30 
percent of total service exports in 2008, respectively (Bank of Portugal 2010: 148).  
  
3.5. The Current Account: 2005–09 versus 1999 
As we have seen, between 1999 and 2005–09 the trade deficit without energy fell by 2.4 
percent of GDP while the surplus in the balance of services increased by 2 percent. As a 
result, the deficit in the balance of goods and services without energy improved by 4.4 
percent of GDP between the two periods (see table 4). By contrast, in the same period 
the current account deficit increased by 1.7 percent of GDP. What accounted for this 
large difference between the behavior of the balance of goods and services and the 
behavior of the current account? Firstly, net remittances shrunk by 1.5 percent of GDP 
between 1999 and 2005–09. Secondly, the increase in the oil price since 1999 enlarged 
the energy deficit by 2 percent of GDP. Finally, as shown in table 5, the accumulation 
of current account deficits culminated in a large net external debt, thus leading to an 
                                                 
11 Tourism has accounted for about 40 percent of total Portuguese services exports in the last decade.   14
increase of 2.7 percent of GDP in the net income payments (mainly interest payments) 
to the rest of the world. 
 
3.6. Summary 
In 1999, the REER of the Portuguese economy was well-above its equilibrium value. 
The current account deficit was equal to -8.5 percent of GDP at full employment. Since 
then, the economy has been subjected to four adverse trends: (i) a decline in the surplus 
of remittances; (ii) an increase in the energy deficit; (iii) a growing external debt service 
and; (iv) fiercer direct competition by both China and the EEC. The combined effect of 
the first three adverse trends was to increase the current account deficit by 6.2 percent of 
GDP and, hence, to push the REER even farther above its initial equilibrium level. In 
addition, the fourth trend tended to lower the equilibrium REER.  
Meanwhile, two factors partially offset these negative trends thus lessening the 
net increase in the current account deficit to only 1.7 percent of GDP by 2009. The first 
factor was the excellent performance of service exports. The second factor was the 
stagnation of domestic demand coupled with strong growth in some of the main 
Portuguese trading partners. This more than offset the effect of the decline in the market 
share of Portuguese exports and the increase in the penetration of imports in Portugal. 
 
4. CAN ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PORTUGAL BE RESTORED?  
 
A lesson from the first eleven years of EMU is that potential costs to members have 
been underestimated. Persistent divergences in growth and inflation have not been given 
sufficient attention by national and European policymakers. The damaging effects of 
divergences now call for painful corrective policies in member economies that have 
been marred by a loss of competitiveness within EMU. In particular, real exchange rate 
adjustment can only be brought about through changes in domestic prices but the latter 
will predictably require a long period of economic stagnation. This section discusses the 
economic policy alternatives available to Portugal and their likely consequences.   
 
4.1. An Increase in the Private Saving Rate 
As illustrated in figure 7, investment in Portugal fell from 27.8 percent in 1999 to an 
average of 22.5 percent of GDP in 2005–08, while domestic saving dropped from 19   15
percent down to 10 percent of GDP over the same period. Therefore, the increase in the 
Portuguese current account deficit was the expression of a larger decline in saving than 
in investment: 9 percent versus 5.3 percent of GDP. These facts have led to the 
suggestion that the current Portuguese malaise can be solved through an increase in the 
saving rate by the private sector.
12 To be sure, an increase in the savings rate would 
reduce consumption, trim down imports, and lead to a smaller current account deficit. 
However, an increase in the private saving rate would also have some adverse effects. 
First, by depressing sales, the ensuing cutback in consumption would have a negative 
impact on investment, which after almost uninterrupted declines in the last eight years, 
is already well-below its 2001 level. Second, it would also slash the demand faced by 
Portuguese firms thus bringing about further increases in unemployment.  
 
4.2. An Increase in Public Saving 
Up until now, the private sector is yet to respond to the calls for a higher saving rate. Be 
that as it may, pressured by a sharp increase in the spread of the public debt, the 
Portuguese government has embarked on a fiscal program aimed at cutting the budget 
deficit from 9.4 percent of GDP in 2009 down to 3 percent in 2012. What are the 
predictable effects? Besides a smaller budget deficit, the effects will be equivalent to an 
increase in the private saving rate, i.e., a smaller current account deficit coupled with 
lower output and higher unemployment.  
 
4.3. A Boost to Net Exports 
In a sense, one could argue that the Portuguese private and public sector deficits are 
mere symptoms of a deeper problem: the large external deficit. For this reason, the 
former can only be addressed—without depressing employment—if there is a large 
enough expansion of net exports. In fact, an increase in net exports would help boost 
domestic output with two consequences. First, even if the saving rate is unchanged, 
aggregate saving would increase, thereby leading to a smaller private sector deficit. 
Second, even if government tax rates remain constant, fiscal revenue would grow and 
bring about a smaller budget deficit. In short, an expansion of net exports would bring 
unemployment down and, at the same time, slash the various deficits of the Portuguese 
                                                 
12 This suggestion has been recently made by many Portuguese economists including President Aníbal 
Cavaco Silva, a retired economics professor. 
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economy. So, the crucial question for the Portuguese economy in the years ahead is this: 
how can a boost in net exports be engendered? 
Figure 8 below depicts the Portuguese tradable sector. The horizontal price line 
results from the fact that the market price in a standard Portuguese tradable sector is 
determined by international competition in the EZ. The upward-sloping supply curve 
UCT reflects the fact that in a typical industry there is a spectrum of firms, ranging from 
the lowest-cost to the highest-cost firms.
13 In this setting, the size of the tradable sector 
is determined by the number of firms whose unit costs happen to be below the market 
price. This, in turn, has the following implication: an upsurge in net exports can only be 
achieved through cutbacks in its unit production costs. 
Now, unit production costs can be reduced by increasing productivity and/or 
trimming down the prices of inputs. Blanchard (2007) recognizes the urgent need to 
enhance Portuguese productivity growth but he nevertheless notices that “productivity 
growth is unlikely however to increase overnight” (Blanchard 2007: 8). Hence, the only 
way to boost net exports in Portugal in the short to medium run is to slash the price of 
its inputs. This, in turn, can be done either through a long and painful “competitive 
disinflation” or through an “across-the-board” cut in nominal wages. The rest of the 
section discusses the likely consequences of these two policies.  
 
4.3.1. Competitive disinflation 
The evidence shows that, even when faced with a prolonged period of high 
unemployment, Portuguese workers are reluctant to accept lower nominal wages. For 
example, since 2005 unemployment has stood above 7.5 percent and yet nominal wage 
growth has shown no signs of abating. From 2005 to 2009 annual nominal wage growth 
was equal to 3.3 percent, up from an average of 2.7 percent in the period 2002–04 when 
unemployment was below 6.8 percent. So, zero nominal wage growth is the most that 
may realistically be expected in Portugal in the years ahead. Now, in the current EZ 
low-inflation environment this constraint severely limits the speed at which Portuguese 
competitiveness can be refloated. Suppose that over the next years nominal wages in the 
EZ grow at the trend of the last decade, 2.4 percent, and that productivity growth in the 
                                                 
13 The height of the supply curve reflects the level of unit production costs—including the normal profit 
margin—of the successive firms.   17
Portuguese tradable sector is the same as in the EZ;
14 then, zero wage growth in 
Portugal would lead to an improvement of competitiveness of only 2.4 percent a year. 
As a result, Portugal would have to endure about a decade of high unemployment until 
competitiveness improves, the current account deficit decreases, and vigorous output 
growth resumes.  
 
4.3.2. An “across-the-board” reduction in nominal wages 
Blanchard (2007) proposes an alternative way to regain competitiveness quickly by 
convincing workers to accept an “across-the-board” reduction in nominal wages—say, 
of 30 percent. Although reckoning this is almost an impossible task, he presents a 
sketch of the implications. First, he notes that “any decrease in nominal wages implies a 
smaller decrease in real (consumption) wages. Indeed, assume that tradable prices 
remain unchanged (determined by competition in the EZ), and that nontradable prices 
are set by a markup on wage cost” (Blanchard 2007: 16). Then, a decrease in nominal 
wages of 30 percent leads to a decrease in the price of nontrabables of 30 percent as 
well. Assuming further that the share of tradables is roughly 50 percent, this leads to a 
decline in the consumer price index of 15 percent, and thus to a reduction of real 
(consumption) wages of 15 percent: only half of the nominal decrease.  
What would be the effects on the Portuguese economy? For simplicity, let us 
assume that labor and nontradables are the sole inputs used in the production of 
tradables. Then, a decline of 30 percent in both nominal wages and nontradable prices 
would reduce unit costs in the tradable sector by roughly 30 percent, thereby 
substantially increasing Portugal’s relative competitiveness. Since the price of tradable 
goods is fixed by competition within the EZ, the number of viable firms in the 
Portuguese tradable sector would increase, thereby boosting net exports. This is 
captured in figure 8, where the nominal wage cut makes the upward-sloping unit cost 
curve (UCT) shift to the right, thus letting output in the tradable sector increase. 
Arguably, a large cut in nominal wages and, hence, in nontradable goods prices 
could adversely affect domestic consumption and investment. This is because the 
Portuguese government and many Portuguese firms and households are heavily 
                                                 
14 From 1999 to 2008, productivity growth in Portugal and the EZ was similar, slightly less than 1 percent 
a year. 
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indebted and, as result of it, are committed to debt payments fixed in nominal terms.
15 
Hence, a 30 percent decline in nominal wages and the resulting fall in prices in the non-
tradable sector would make many indebted households and firms unable to honor their 
fixed debt payments. In turn, this could (at least partially) offset the demand stimulus 
coming from the expansion of the tradable sector.   
Next, let us assume that the euro freely floats vis-à-vis other currencies so as to 
keep the EZ current account with the rest of the world in balance.
16 The crucial issue is 
that any improvement in relative competitiveness in an individual EZ country that is not 
achieved through an increase in productivity will—in the absence of real depreciation of 
the euro—be exactly offset by a worsening in the relative competitiveness of other EZ 
countries. In other words, changes in relative competitiveness not achieved through 
increases in productivity do not represent Pareto-improving changes for the EZ as a 
whole but constitute “zero-sum” games.
17 Another way of putting this is that changes in 
relative competitiveness within the EZ achieved by means of wage deflation entail a 
“fallacy of composition” whereby what holds for an individual country―that it can 
increase its net exports and expand employment in the tradable goods sector by cutting 
nominal wages—does not hold for the EZ as a whole. The reason is straightforward: if 
the nominal exchange rate of the euro floats freely to keep the EZ (global) current 
account roughly in balance, then an increase in net exports in any EZ country will be 
exactly matched by a decrease in net exports in other EZ countries. The adjustment of 
the exchange rate occurs since, as argued in Kregel (1999), any decrease in average unit 
labor costs in the EZ will lead to a nominal appreciation of the euro against other major 
                                                 
15 At the end of 2009, the total debt of households had reached 99.1 percent of GDP, the total debt of 
nonfinancial firms had risen to 151.3 percent of GDP, and government debt represented 76.8 percent of 
GDP (Bank of Portugal 2010). These debts add up to 327.2 percent of GDP. Who owns these debts? 
Slightly less than one-third of the total debt is owned by nonresidents. The rest comprises domestic 
savings in bonds and deposit accounts as counterparts. 
16 This assumption is realistic since the current account of the EZ vis-à-vis the rest of the world has been 
broadly in balance ever since the launch of the EMU in 1999.   
17 By contrast, improvements in relative competitiveness in an (small) individual EZ economy that are 
achieved by virtue of an increase in productivity do represent Pareto-improving changes for the EZ as a 
whole. In that case, real (consumption) wages in the tradable goods sector would remain roughly 
constant, employment would expand due to the increase in net exports, and output in the EZ as a whole 
would increase. If the increase in relative competitiveness in an individual EZ economy is instead the 
result of nominal wage cuts, then real (consumption) wages in the export sector will decrease whereas, as 
before, employment in that sector will expand. As for the nontradable goods sector, an increase in 
productivity will bring about increases in real (consumption) wages (for workers in both the tradable and 
nontradable sector) whereas the impact on the level of employment in that sector is a priori uncertain. 
Finally, a cut in wages in the nontradable goods sector will lead to a decrease and an increase in real 
(consumption) wages in the nontradable and the tradable goods sector, respectively, the effect on 
employment in the nontradable goods sector being also uncertain.   
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currencies so that the real effective exchange rate remains roughly constant. Finally, if 
EZ countries set about increasing their competitiveness by cutting wages then the 
benefit to any individual country is likely to be meager since other EZ countries will 
predictably replicate this policy. Whether such policy would be beneficial for the EZ as 
a whole is discussed below.    
From the previous discussion it follows that the crucial issue when gauging the 
viability of an (export-led) growth strategy for the EZ as a whole based on nominal 
wage deflation is whether or not nominal appreciations of the euro will offset decreases 
in unit labor costs (measured in euros) so as to maintain the real effective exchange rate 
constant. If so, decreases in nominal wages either in individual countries or across the 
EZ will not lead to increases in net exports for the EZ as a whole. Here, we can only 
conjecture. For instance, Zemanek, Belke, and Schnabl (2009: 31) argue that wage 
deflation in EZ deficit countries will increase the international competitiveness of 
Europe as a whole. Thus, they implicitly assume that decreases in unit labor costs in EZ 
countries will not be offset by nominal appreciations of the euro. By contrast, it has 
been argued that the ECB has an ideological objection to building stores of US dollars 
and that the outcome is that the “euro is overvalued and exporters cannot achieve the 
necessary growth that is required to boost the domestic economies” (Mitchell and 
Muysken 2006: 6). These authors propose that the ECB should acquire large quantities 
of US dollars reserves to support the EZ export sector. In other words, to them, the 
viability of an “export-oriented” growth strategy hinges on whether or not the ECB is 
willing to engineer a real depreciation of the euro.
18   
A formal analysis of this issue is addressed in Godley and Lavoie (2007) who 
perform a simulation exercise in a stock-flow consistent model with three economies 
(two EZ countries and the United States) and two currencies (the US dollar and the 
euro) where output is demand-determined. Their results suggest that decreases in unit 
labor costs in individual EZ economies will tend to be offset by nominal appreciations 
of the euro, thus leaving the real exchange rate roughly constant. In particular, they 
simulate the impact on the relative income levels of the three economies (the US 
economy and two EZ economies) of an increase in the import propensity in one of the 
EZ economies. They find that, after an initial and temporary increase, the US GDP 
                                                 
18 However, as Arestis and Sawyer (2006) point out, targeting the exchange rate would require direct 
intervention by the ECB in the exchange markets and, therefore, this would require a broadening of its 
mandate to allow it to pursue an exchange rate target that is conducive to employment growth in the EZ.   
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settles at the initial level in the new stationary-state owing to the relative appreciation of 
the US dollar vis-à-vis the euro. Crucially, they find that, owing to the relative 
depreciation of the euro, the GDP of the EZ economy whose import propensity initially 
increased settles at a lower level whereas the GDP of the other EZ economy settles at a 
higher level. Importantly, this exercise suggests that, were the import propensity of an 
individual EZ economy to decline due, for instance, to a decline in its nominal wage 
costs, there would be a relative (nominal) appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US 
dollar so that, in the new stationary state, the GDP of the EZ economy whose import 
propensity initially decreased would settle at a higher level, whereas the GDP of the 
other EZ economy would settle at a lower level. In other words, the decline in nominal 
wages in an individual EZ economy does not lead to an increase in the GDP of the EZ 
as a whole but only redistributes a given level of output between the two EZ economies.   
  
5. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE EMU  
 
As illustrated in figure 9 below, by participating in the process of financial and 
monetary integration in Europe, southern EZ countries were led into increasing current 
account deficits with no mechanism guaranteeing their subsequent correction. In the 
mid-1990s, these countries were much poorer and had much lower capital per worker 
than northern EZ countries. As a result, the expected returns on investment were higher 
in the south and led to an expansion in investment financed by northern savings. To a 
greater extent, the south stepped up consumption, financed by northern savings, in 
anticipation of higher income growth. Thus, southern EZ countries ran large current 
account deficits whereas northern EZ countries ran large current account surpluses 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002: 148). 
Now, the completion of this process ought to involve a subsequent future period 
in which southern countries switched from net importers to net exporters and thereby 
paid the accumulated debts.
19 Which mechanisms were supposed to bring about this 
switch? The new invested capital would boost productivity growth—supposedly in the 
tradable sector—and thereby enhance competitiveness and net exports. If that boost in 
productivity happened to be insufficient, relative nominal wages would fall so as to 
                                                 
19 In a similar vein, Stockhammer (2011) argues that the peripheral EZ countries can only solve their 
public debt problems in the coming years if there is a change in German current account surpluses.  
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improve competitiveness further and generate the net exports needed to pay the 
accumulated debts. 
In practice, however, these mechanisms have not operated. To begin with, the 
current account deficits of the south reflected mainly increases in private consumption 
in anticipation of higher future incomes and not the upsurges in investment which were 
supposed to generate the needed increase in relative competitiveness. Hence, instead of 
catching-up, productivity in the south drifted below that of the north (see figure 10). 
Secondly, most of the increase in investment in the south went into nontradable sectors 
and thus hardly led to a significant increase in either productivity or productive capacity 
in the tradable goods sectors. Finally, at least in some countries, the financial inflows 
during the supposed convergence process boosted domestic demand and output in the 
south above full employment. As a result, inflation in the south rose relative to the north 
and, thus, competitiveness in the south declined relative to the north (in the case of 
Portugal, see figure 4). 
If southern countries had not joined the EZ their big current account deficits 
would have by now led to the large exchange rate depreciation needed to boost their 
competitiveness and switch their current accounts into surpluses. In theory, the same 
could be achieved through equivalent declines in wages. Yet, wages exhibit downward 
nominal rigidity and, hence, unit costs have for several years remained too high in the 
south and too low in the north, preventing the correction of the imbalances between the 
two regions. What can be done? In what follows, we make two suggestions: imposing a 
ceiling on current account imbalances—either deficits or surplus—of individual EZ 
countries and raising the inflation target of the ECB. 
 
5.1. Imposing Ceilings on Current Account Imbalances of Individual Countries 
As we have just seen, the process of financial and monetary integration led to increasing 
current account imbalances in Europe with no mechanism guaranteeing their subsequent 
correction. This has caused a tremendous disturbance in the southern economies of the 
EZ, which now face a long period of stagnation. We believe that a simple rule, had it 
been adopted ten or fifteen years ago, could have prevented the developments that have 
led to the situation southern EZ countries (and Ireland) are now locked in. Specifically, 
instead of imposing strict limits on budget deficits as the “Stability and Growth Pact” 
(S&GP hereafter) currently does, we believe that a more sensible policy would have 
been to impose legally-binding ceilings on current account imbalances—deficits or   22
surplus—of individual EZ countries.
20 We may even argue that if this rule were 
implemented now, the current imbalances in the EZ would probably be corrected 
without any significant economic distress—either in the north or in the south of Europe. 
The rest of this section explains why.  
  Pressured by the steep increases in the spreads on their sovereign debt, southern 
EZ countries are currently implementing fiscal programs aimed at cutting their budget 
and, implicitly, their external deficits. As explained above, fiscal consolidation will help 
reduce their current account deficits at the expense of raising unemployment even 
further. However, and importantly, the reduction in imports of the south from the 
north―exports of the north to the south―will also depress output and employment in 
the north. Is there an alternative? At the moment, expansionary fiscal policy in the south 
is clearly not a viable option since compliance with the S&GP precludes it. By contrast, 
expansionary fiscal policy in the north (at least in some countries) is a viable option. 
Such policy would boost demand and output in the north but this, in turn, would 
increase imports of the north from the south, and thus reduce the northern current 
account surplus. Finally, the increase in imports of the north from the south―exports of 
the south to the north―would raise output and employment in the south and, at the 
same time, diminish its current account deficit. In sum, restrictive fiscal policy in the 
south coupled with expansionary fiscal policy in the north could curb the present current 
account imbalances without depressing output and employment across it. Hence the 
question: What could lead the north to implement expansionary fiscal policies? If they 
faced an upper limit for their current account surplus of (say) 2 percent, they would 
have no alternative.
21  
Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future. In 
addition to the constraints imposed by the S&GP, Germany has recently adopted the so-
called “debt brake” whereby the nation is limited to federal government budget deficits 
of no more than 0.35 percent of GDP from 2016 (Proissl 2010). According to this law, 
the German government can only violate the deficit threshold in case of deep recessions 
                                                 
20 To the best of our knowledge, a similar proposal has been suggested in Brecht et al. (2010).  
 
21 It could be objected that, if surplus countries adopt an expansionary fiscal policy stance as proposed 
above, they might reach full employment before their current account balances exhibit a deficit thus 
jeopardizing the intra-EMU imbalances correcting mechanism proposed above. However, if that were the 
case, the emergence of wage inflation in surplus countries would tend to make their relative 
competitiveness worsen and this would eventually lead to an improvement in deficit countries’ relative 
competitiveness.     
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and natural disasters and always provided there is a two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
Thus, the “debt brake” severely restricts the German government ability’s to run deficits 
and will predictably prevent this proposal from even being considered.   
 
5.2. Raising the Inflation Target of the ECB 
As is well-known, real wages tend to grow in line with productivity in the long run. 
Productivity growth in the EZ has been close to 1 percent since 1999. If this growth rate 
continues over the next decade, real wages in the EZ will probably also grow at an 
annual rate of 1 percent. With average inflation in the EZ remaining at the current 2 
percent, this means that nominal wages in the EZ will tend to grow on average at 3 
percent per year. But the high unemployment rates may halt nominal wage growth in 
southern EZ countries. Hence, if the required relative nominal wage reduction in these 
countries is equal to about 30 percent, then the necessary period of high unemployment 
in the south will be about 10 years. 
What would happen if the ECB decided to raise its inflation target up to (say) 5 
percent? Average nominal wage growth in the EZ would now increase from 3 to 6 
percent per year. Again, if nominal wage growth in the south were equal to zero, then 
the reduction of relative nominal wages in the south would now accelerate from 3 to 6 
percent a year and, consequently, the required period of high unemployment in the 
south would decrease from 10 to 5 years.
22 Sadly enough, as in the case of the ceilings 
on current account imbalances, this proposal faces a serious obstacle. Article 127 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon states that the primary objective of the ECB shall be to maintain price 
stability and that one of the basic tasks of the ECB is to define and implement the 
monetary policy of the Union. In turn, the Governing Council of the ECB clarified in 
2003 that it aims to maintain inflation rates below but close to 2 percent over the 
medium term (ECB 2004: 51). Thus, under the current institutional setting, the ECB 
independently decides the quantitative definition of price stability as enshrined in the 
Treaty. It is unlikely that the ECB will accept to revise its inflation target upward to 
help “grease the wheels” of labor markets in troubled EZ countries.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Palley (2006) provides a formal analysis of the impact of increases in the target inflation rate of the 
central bank in a non-optimum currency area such as the EZ. He shows that the formation of a non-
optimal currency area shifts the Phillips curve to the right and worsens the inflation-unemployment trade-
off. He concludes that optimal monetary policy requires, in this setting, a higher target inflation rate.      24
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
 
The dramatic sovereign debt crisis currently afflicting the Mediterranean EZ countries 
and Ireland has brought to the fore the rising heterogeneity observed within the EZ. As 
some studies emphasize, there has been a persistent loss in international 
competitiveness for the Mediterranean EZ countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) 
vis-à-vis Germany since the launch of the euro in 1999. In turn, this situation has 
translated into large current account deficits being exhibited by these countries along 
with high levels of indebtedness by both the private and public sector. Furthermore, the 
integration of these countries into the EZ has so far consisted essentially of an intense 
process of financial integration whereby they have financed their current account 
deficits by increasing their indebtedness vis-à-vis core EZ countries like Germany. 
Having embarked upon ambitious fiscal consolidation and unpopular structural reforms 
these countries currently face a painful decade of stagnation and high unemployment. 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the growth prospects within the EMU for 
Portugal. In the process, we made two proposals for institutional reform of the EMU 
with a view to restoring economic growth across the EZ. Our main conclusion is that, in 
the absence of deep institutional reform in the EMU, growth prospects for Portugal are 
dim and so leaving the EZ currently represents a serious political option for Portugal.    25
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Figure 1: Portugal, International Investment Position (percent of GDP), 1999–2009 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal (2010: 181) 
 
Figure 2: The Balance of Goods and Services, with and without Energy 
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Figure 3: REER based on HIPC and ULC, 1995–2008 
 
             Source: IMF (2010) 
 
Figure 4: Inflation in Portugal and in the Eurozone 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Market Share of Portuguese Exports of Goods 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal (2010) 
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Figure 7: Portugal—Saving, Investment, and the Current Account, 1996–2009 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal (1997, 2005, 2009a, and 2010) 
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           Figure 9: Current Account (percent of GDP), 1992–2007 
 
           Note: The north includes Austria, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands whereas the south  
             includes Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain 
             Source: Holinski, Kool, and Muysken (2010: 3) 
 
            Figure 10: Relative Total Factor Productivity (average = 100), 1992–2007 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Portugal, Main Macroeconomic Indicators, 1999–2009 
  99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07  08  09 
Private 
consumption 
5.3 3.7 1.3 1.3 -0.2 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.7  1.7  -0.8 
Public 
consumption 
4.1 3.6 3.3 2.6 0.2 2.6 3.2 -1.4 0.0  1.1  3.5 
Investment  7.8 3.5 1.0 -3.5 -7.4 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 3.1  -0.7  -11.1 
Domestic 
demand* 
6.2 3.6 1.8 0.1 -2.2 2.7 1,6 0.9 1.9  1.3  -2.8 
Total exports  3.0 8.4 1.8 1.4 3.9 4.0 2.1 8.7 7.8 -0.5  -11.6 
Service exports  2.8 9.0 2.3 0.4 -2.8 5.8 2.1  11.7  12.9 1.5  -6.5 
Imports  8.6 5.3 0.9 -0.7  -0.9 6.7 3.5 5.2 6.1  2.7  -9.2 
Net Exports*  -2.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.4 -1.2  -0.7 0.5 0.0 -1.2  0.1 
Unemployment  4.4 3.9 4.0 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.6 7.7 8.0  7.6  9.5 
GDP  3.8 3.9 2.0 0.8 -0.8 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.9  0.0  -2.7 
Current account  -8.5 -10.2 -9.8  -8.0  -6.0  -7.5 -9.4 -9.9 -9.4 -12.0  -10.3 
Int. Inv. 
Position 
-33.1 -41.1 -48.6 -57.1 -59.0 -63.8 -70.0 -81.1 -92.4  -99.2  -111.5 
* Contribution to GDP growth in percentage points 
Source: Bank of Portugal (2009a and 2010) 
 
Table 2: Portugal, Current Account, percent of GDP, 1996–2009 
  96  97  98  99     00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09 
 Current 
Account 
-4,2  -5,9  -7,0 -8,5 -10,2 -9,8  -8,0 -6,0  -7,5 -9,4  -9,9  -9,4 -12,0 -10,3 
  Goods  -8,4  -9,4  -10,8  -11,9 -12,9 -12,0 -10,4 -9,1  -10,3  -11,0 -10,8 -10,8 -12,8 -10,5 
Services  1,2  1,3  1,6  1,6 1,8 2,3 2,5  2,7  2,9  2,7 3,3 4,0 4,0 3,7 
 Factor   
incomes 
-0,8  -1,2  -1,3  -1,4 -2,1 -3,0 -2,3  -1,7  -2,1  -2,6 -4,0 -4,2 -4,7 -4,8 
 Remitt.  2,9  2,9  2,7  2,6 2,7 2,6 1,8  1,4  1,4  1,2 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,1 
Source: Bank of Portugal (2007, 2009a, and 2010) 
 
Table 3: Portugal—Domestic Demand Growth, Current Account, and 
Unemployment 
Domestic demand growth 2002–9: 0.4%  1999 2005–9 
Current account  -8.5% GDP -10.2% GDP 
Unemployment 4.4%  8.1% 
 Source: Bank of Portugal (2010) and authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Portugal—Balance of Goods and Services without Energy, percent of 
GDP 
Balances (percent of GDP)  1999  2005–09 Δ 
Goods without energy  -10%  -7.6%  +2.4%
Services 1.6%  3.6%  +2% 
Goods and service without energy  -8.4% -4%  +4.4%
Source: Bank of Portugal (2010) and authors’ calculations 
 
Table 5: Portugal, Current Account, percent of GDP 
Balances (percent of GDP)  1999  2005–09  Δ 
Goods and services without energy  -8.4%  -4%  +4.4% 
Remittances 2.6%  1.1%  -  1.5%
Energy 1.8%  3.8%  -  2% 
Net income payments  -1.4%  -4.1%  - 2.7%
Current account  -8.5%  -10.2%  -1.7% 
Source: Bank of Portugal (2010: 173, 176) and authors’ calculations 